The Reference Class Problem and Probabilities in the Individual Case: A Response to Fuller

Philosophy of Science 90 (4):1001-1009 (2023)
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Abstract

In a recent article on the interpretation of probability in evidence-based medical practice, Jonathan Fuller argues that we should interpret probabilities as credences in individual cases because this avoids some important problems. In this article, I argue that Fuller misidentifies the real issue and so fails to offer a meaningful solution to it. The real problem with making probability judgments in individual cases is deciding which objective considerations ought to constrain our formation of credences. This leads us to the reference class problem, which, as Alan Hajek argues, is a problem for any interpretation of probability.

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Arjun Devanesan
King's College London

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