A Celebration of Subjective Thought

Southern Illinois University Press (1984)
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Abstract

Seeing objective thought as passive, Diefenbeck seeks to develop a theory of thought or of reason “appropriate to the subject as an active agent or first cause.” His system would illuminate and render more effective the creation of values that guide lives. George Kimball Plochmann in his foreword describes the book as “a sus­tained inquiry into the character of knowledge, one seeking to prove that our exclusive cognitive allegiance to the so-called objective sciences is misplaced, not so much because they are faulty in detail or deficient in humanitarian feel­ing, as because they cannot enjoy the epistemological support that they would require were they allowed the hegemony over other branches of cognition that is traditionally accorded them.” Diefenbeck would not destroy objec­tive knowledge, but would allow each philosophy to confront subjective phi­losophy and from the results of that confrontation build a better system of values

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