Amending the Military’s Rules of Engagement to Consider Blame

Journal of Military Ethics 23 (2):117-133 (2024)
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Abstract

I am concerned that the military’s Rules of Engagement (ROE) exclusively focus on prescribing permissible actions but fail to consider the servicemembers’ blameworthiness. In explaining this concern, I will illuminate how permissible actions do not necessarily yield blamelessness. While permissibility is generally a function of rules or good outcomes, blameworthiness is at least a function of an agent’s intentions. Why should we care about permissible actions done with blameworthy intentions? I offer two distinct motivations. Using a self-defense situation as an example, I explain that neglecting to consider blame can increase the magnitude of harm done to an apparent but merely possible attacker. Secondly, we should certainly be concerned about the harms done to servicemembers, and I show that ROE that fail to prescribe a blameless intention may result in increased harm to servicemembers in the form of a “moral injury”. In even more general terms, I am advocating for a more robust in bello consideration of intentions.

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Stephen DiLorenzo
United States Military Academy

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References found in this work

Self-defense.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1991 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (4):283-310.
Normative Ethics.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - Mind 109 (434):373-377.
Moral Injury.Jonathan Shay - 2012 - Intertexts 16 (1):57-66.
Recipe for a Theory of Self-Defense.Larry Alexander - 2016 - In Christian Coons & Michael Weber (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.

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