Lewis' Account of Counterfactuals is Incongruent with Lewis' Account of Laws of Nature

Abstract

In this paper we argue that there is a problem with the conjunction of David Lewis' account of counterfactual conditionals and his account of laws of nature. This is a pressing problem since both accounts are individually plausible, and popular.

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Author Profiles

Foad Dizadji-Bahmani
California State University, Los Angeles
Seamus Bradley
London School of Economics (PhD)

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.

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