Abstract

My dissertation is an attempt to reconcile two plausible and widely held claims: first, that reasons explain actions, and second, that actions have sufficient physical causes. These claims come into conflict when we make the following three common assumptions: one, that beliefs, desires and other intentional states are irreducible to physical states; two, that a physical causal explanation of a particular event will make redundant a mental causal explanation of that same event; and three, that reason-giving explanations are causal explanations. I bring the initial two claims back into compatibility by defending the first two assumptions and rejecting the third. In maintaining that reason-giving explanations are not causal explanations per se, and thus not in competition with physical causal explanations, I show how it is possible for reasons to genuinely explain actions despite the fact that actions have sufficient physical causes. ;I explore in some detail the main reasons why the causal approach to reason-giving explanations is problematic. One focus is the "Exclusion Argument," which purports to demonstrate the causal irrelevance of intentional states to physical events. But explaining how beliefs and desires can be causally efficacious assuming nonreductive physicalism is only part of the problem. I argue that alternative accounts of causal relevance may vindicate the causal efficacy of intentional states, but there is still the question of how these causal claims and explanations relate to physical causal claims and explanations for the same event. I consider two possible solutions to this causal and explanatory competition, and argue that neither is successful. ;My alternative account is a novel brand of functionalism about intentional properties. Intentional properties are second-order properties that have their explanatory power by specifying functional roles that are ultimately filled by physical states. The roles form part of a system that we use to describe and understand our own and others' behavior. Second-order properties are not causally relevant, but they do have explanatory relevance. Reason-giving explanations do not compete with physical explanations because they are not themselves causal explanations, nor are they independent from physical causal explanations