What Zif

Abstract

In a series of articles, David Barnett (2006, 2009, 2010) has developed a general theory of conditionals. The grand aim is to reconcile the two main rivals: a suppositional and a truth-conditional view (Barnett 2006, 521). While I confine my critical discussion to counterfactuals, I will give some hints how they might spell trouble for his suppositional view in general.

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Similar books and articles

Zif is if.David Barnett - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):519-566.
Zif would have been if: A suppositional view of counterfactuals.David Barnett - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):269-304.
The myth of the categorical counterfactual.David Barnett - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):281 - 296.
I-Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.
Realizing what might be.Malte Willer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):365 - 375.
Conditionals, Literal Content, and 'DeRose's Thesis': A Reply to Barnett.K. DeRose - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):443-455.
IV-Counterfactual Entailment.David Barnett - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):73-97.
Non-Propositionalism and The Suppositional Rule.Tom Beevers - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-22.
The social and communicative function of conditional statements.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2005 - Mind and Society 4 (1):97-113.

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Daniel Dohrn
Università degli Studi di Milano

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