Abstract

In his initial dissertation the author asked the question of "naturalizibility" of self-conscience; in the following book he has already criticized "naturalism" as a defect idiom. He takes language as a tool of his critical strategy. He refers to the paradox of the anthropomorphic understanding of nature and the physiomorphic self-understanding of man. There are three main parts in the book. First, various naturalist strategies, starting with American Naturalism, are exposed. Human language has been characterized as an unconventional means of description of natural and factual contents. Three areas, or "paradigms," have been found exemplary for the "naturalism at work", evolutionary theory, psychoanalysis, and cybernetics. The next part centers in two chapters on the "language dualism" where there is a concept tension caused by the spirit-body problem and the two universes of discourse, in accord with the ideals of naturalism, should not be ontologically substantiated. In accord with the fundamental theory, one can assert a mentalist or a physicalist discourse, the language of action or of occurrence, or also the intentionalist or mechanist idiom. The third main block of exposition analyses the two basic types of metaphors, namely, the anthropomorphic and the physiomorphic. Before starting his survey of five metaphor theories, Keil expressly rejects the Iconic Signification Theory. He is sure metaphors are hyper-conceptual elements of language. Two of the theories present more virtues than defects, the Theory of Interaction and the pragmatist Theory of Indirect Communication. At the end of these reflections the author confronts the metaphor of man as a machine with teleology and, on the other hand, thinks of problems linked with the human spirit as a computer metaphor. Two chapters form the finale of the book. In accord with Keil the concept of nature in the natural sciences seems to have died out resulting in "naturalism" becoming a conceptually unclear term. Another problem is causality, for the "propter hoc" is not unfolded in the world of bodies. Relations, including causal ones, are abstract entities. The notion of causality in nature cannot be counted as an intentional concept but, at the same time, causal theories of knowledge and action cannot serve to naturalize intentionality.