Abstract

Abstract:The notions "retinal images" and "retinal projection" are ubiquitous in both the scientific and philosophical literature on perception. However, this article argues that they belong to the former and should be kept out of the latter. In the context of the empirical investigation of perception, projections play a crucial role, and help articulate pressing research problems. But, as part of the phenomenological and conceptual analysis of perception, projections give rise to untenable models and to avoidable conundrums, such as the much discussed issue of perceptual constancy. Why are projections and retinal images so prevalent in the philosophical literature? The author conjectures that the reason has to do with conceptual fallouts of the effort to give a geometric representation to changes of perspective, a mission more daunting than it initially appears to be, and one that leads to the problematic insertion of projections into phenomenology. He suggests that correcting this shows perceptual constancy to be a starting point rather than a challenge for phenomenology.