Abstract

Everyone agrees that freedom is a good, and many would hold that it is a supreme good. But do human beings need freedom? That is, do we need freedom in the same way that we need food, shelter, love, and the respect of others? In this paper, I argue, first, that we do have a vital need for a good measure of negative freedom. I call this "the Negative Necessity Thesis." I then argue, second, that we do not have a vital need for positive freedom. This I call "the Positive Non-necessity Thesis." Following D. Wiggins, I hold that someone vitally needs x if, and only if, it is necessary, things being what they are, that she avoids being severely harmed only if she has x. I reach the first thesis on the ground that if you lack a good measure of negative freedom, then you suffer from imprisoned agency and special vulnerability to having your interests trampled. This suffices for the severe harms involved in a vital needs not being met. I reach the second thesis on the ground that lacking positive freedom does not pose a serious threat to your enjoying all the capabilities essential to ordinary human functioning, and thus does not severely harm you. The two theses help explain the widespread feeling that negative and positive freedom are both very valuable, but that in the end, negative freedom is the more important.