Abstract

The development of genetic phenomenology marks a change in Husserl's thinking which occurred between 1917 and 1921. Much of the second half of his philosophical life was devoted to genetic phenomenology as a supplement to the static phenomenology of his earlier writings. I argue that the development of genetic phenomenology, which involves a regressive inquiry into the genesis of the ego and of meaning, coincided with and made possible a greater emphasis on ethical and intersubjective positions in Husserl's later writings. ;I trace the development of three prominent themes in Husserl's thought: time-consciousness, intersubjectivity, and ethics. In each case it is possible to see that prior to 1917 Husserl's phenomenology was not equipped to address such topics with the complexity they require. Static phenomenology has a rigid structure focusing on complete constitution of meaning by an already fully active ego. This position lacks the framework for investigating the development of the ego itself and of the transformation of meaning through time. In moving his thought beyond that rigid structure and addressing questions of historicity, Husserl began to incorporate an understanding of intersubjectivity based on the sedimentation of meanings built up through successive generations. Such an approach provides a way to think plurality in community without either the elimination of ethical foundations or the elimination of the importance of inherited convictions. The same sensitivity to the historical development of meaning made possible the later Husserl's theory of renewal and critique of history and tradition. ;This study concludes that Husserl's static phenomenological investigation into essences in combination with his genetic inquiry into origins provides a model of philosophical thinking that offers a balanced account both of individual freedom and of historical and traditional context. The goal of this project is to demonstrate that Husserl's later understanding of the human being as inheritor of an ethical tradition, but as still responsible for the taking-up of that tradition, would not have been possible had he not developed genetic phenomenology as an explanatory supplement to static phenomenology