Abstract

Chapter One: James is often accused of claiming that a belief is true just in case it is useful. The objections to this view are obvious. I offer a more sophisticated interpretation of James's theory of truth, and defend it from the standard objections. Chapter Two: I discuss Steve Stich's notorious claim that `once we have a clear view of the matter, most of us will not find any value, either intrinsic or instrumental, in having true beliefs.' I argue that Stich reaches this conclusion only because he makes some false assumptions about content-determination. I show that using an interpretationist account of content-determination we can explain the value of true beliefs. Chapters Three and Four: `Definitionalism' is my name for the thesis that the theorems of mathematics are a priori because they are entailed by definitions. I discuss two objections to this view: the `Kantian' objection and the Quinean objection. According to the `Kantian' objection, definitionalism must be false because existential generalisations can't be true by definition. According to the Quinean objection, the definitionalist's distinction between definitions and other statements is illicit, because it is not discernible in mathematical practice. I argue that the Kantian objection is misguided, but the Quinean objection is correct. Chapter Five: Elitists draw a distinction between two sorts of word: the elite and the plebeian. They claim that only by using the elite words can we describe the world as it is `anyway'; using the plebeian words, we can at best describe the world as it seems to us, with our own particular physiology, tastes and history. For the sake of argument I grant these claims, but then contend that we have no way of identifying the elite expressions.