How to frame the free will problem

Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):149-72 (1994)
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10.1007/bf00989884

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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The nature of morality: an introduction to ethics.Gilbert Harman - 1977 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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