The Pragmatics of Belief

Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.

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2010-12-26

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Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Citations of this work

Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.
Taste, traits, and tendencies.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1183-1206.
Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.

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