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Why pains are not mental objects
Philosophical Studies 91 (2):127-148 (1998)
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Only I can have.P. M. S. Hacker - 1990 - In Wittgenstein, meaning and mind. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 25–40.
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Citations of this work
Motivation and Emotion: An Interactive Process Model.Mark H. Bickhard - 2000 - In Ralph D. Ellis (ed.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins. pp. 161.
Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3557-3586.
References found in this work
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Moore's refutation of idealism.C. J. Ducasse - 1952 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co.. pp. 225-251.
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