Abstract

Ordinary competent language speakers experience difficulty in paraphrasing words such as ‘the’, ‘but’ or ‘however’ as compared to words such as ‘chair’ or ‘run’. The difficulty experienced in the first case is sometimes called descriptive ineffability. In recent debates about meaning types in pragmatics and philosophy of language, descriptive ineffability has been used as a test for the presence of expressive (as opposed to descriptive) meaning, or procedural (as opposed to conceptual) meaning. However, the notion of descriptive ineffability is controversial and in need of further clarification. In this paper I provide two arguments that descriptive ineffability is not a good criterion for distinguishing between types of meaning. First, I show that the effability/ineffability divide does not line up with distinctions in meaning type. Second, I argue that several effability/ineffability patterns are best explained not by the meaning types of words but by differences in the range and scope of speakers’ metalinguistic ability to paraphrase, as it is shaped by experience throughout their lives.