Critical thinking: stress-testing competing reasons in the practical domain

Journal of Philosophy of Education (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Harvey Siegel has argued that successful critical thinking requires both a critical mindset and expertise in evaluating reasons. In this article, I focus on the latter, the business of accurately appraising competing reasons in the practical domain. More specifically, I critically examine the limitations inherent in two commonly used epistemic frameworks: the balance account and reasons-for-and-against. I argue neither is suitable for scenarios requiring especially nuanced appraisals or complex metrics. This is because they primarily deal with somewhat crude approximations and/or binary choices. I will propose a new framework to address this concern. I dub this the Stress-Testing-Critique-Support-Explanationist Account (STCSEA). STCSEA is engineered to handle complex practical epistemic situations, ones where determining what to do is not straightforward or immediately calculable. To fully understand the accurate and reliable determination of competing reasons’ strengths and weaknesses, educators require sophisticated tools. Such tools can help us fully to grasp the concept and mechanics of rational defeat—that being figuring out the strength of competing reasons. To do so, we must also formulate and continuously refine an operationalized defeasibility taxonomy.I proceed as follows. I begin by providing a brief overview of the critical thinking debate. I then survey John Pollock’s work on defeaters. This work is germane to the conversation yet remains something of a lacuna in the contemporary philosophy of education literature. After this, I discuss the balance account and reasons-for-and-against, specifically their evident limitations. I then make a case for the superiority of STCSEA when it comes to handling ‘hard cases’. These are cases where what we should, must, or may do necessitates a complex computation. Such computations often exceed the mathematical or epistemic resources associated with ‘balancing metaphors’ and ‘for and against’ determinations.

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References found in this work

Reasons First.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - International Journal of Ethics 41 (3):343-351.

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