On the Alleged Inconsistency in Van Inwagen’s Rebuttal of Evans’ Argument

Studia Neoaristotelica 18 (1):3-26 (2021)
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Abstract

The paper attempts to interpret P. van Inwagen’s refutation of Evans’ argument that there cannot be vague objects and defend it against the charge of inconsistency raised by Radim Bělohrad. However, such an interpretation is not without a cost. Therefore another interpretation of van Inwagen’s example of the Cabinet is offered which evades Evans’ charge of inconsistency against indeterminate identity as it does not need the notion at all.

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Petr Dvorak
Palacky University

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