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A new starting place for the semantics of belief sentences
In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 208--232 (2009)
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Citations of this work
Do Acquaintance Theorists Have an Attitude Problem?Rachel Goodman - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):67-86.
Complex demonstratives, singular thought, and belief attributions.José Manuel Viejo - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-27.
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