Abstract

A number of philosophers in recent years have argued that Plotinus is a philosopher whose concerns can be divorced from his mystical experiences. Eakin argues that Plotinus is both a mystic and a philosopher. Plotinus' discursive reasoning is designed to point beyond discursive reasoning and descriptive metaphysics to suprarational experience of the intelligible in nous and of union with the One. As with the skeptics, discursive reasoning often runs aground in "tensions" or inconsistences. Eakin examines these tensions in relation to questions of whether or not there are forms of individuals; the nature of matter; and causality. The project of discursive reasoning points toward higher experiences of nous and the One that are assumed by but finally beyond the grasp of such reasoning. This in no way makes Plotinus anti-rational. It does suggest, however, that any attempt to understand Plotinus' philosophy as separable from his mysticism is misled. Philosophy and theoria take on theurgical power for Plotinus, and it is in non-discursive sorts of experience that discursive philosophy will terminate