From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual Diversity

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (1):3-8 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

Citations of this work

Backwards Causation in Social Institutions.Kenneth Silver - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1973-1991.

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References found in this work

Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 286-298.
The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.

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