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Folk psychology and cognitive architecture
Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96 (1995)
Abstract
It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive scienceAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
There are no i-beliefs or i-desires at work in fiction consumption and this is why.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-233.
Data, Metadata, Mental Data? Privacy and the Extended Mind.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 14 (2):84-96.
Creativity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 262-296.
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
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