Relativism about Epistemic Modals

In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 843–864 (1997)
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Abstract

This chapter focuses on relativism, and outlines debate about relativism about epistemic modals. The debate will be helpful to say a bit more about the structure of contextualist theories, since contextualism is the main competitor to relativism, and probably is the default starting point view. Accordingly, much of the motivation for relativism comes from the purported inadequacy of the contextualist options. The chapter looks at some of the important features of contextualist views in general. It discusses the internal workings of two different sorts of relativist theories and some standard arguments relativists have deployed to motivate relativism over contextualism. The chapter traces a few of the first steps of the ensuing dialectic of reply and objection and looks at a number of the standard replies to relativist arguments. It looks at some of the anti‐relativists' responses to the relativists' positive arguments.

Other Versions

reprint Egan, Andy (2010) "Relativism About Epistemic Modals". In Hales, Steven D., A Companion to Relativism, pp. 219–241: Wiley-Blackwell (2010)

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A. M. Egan
University of Toronto

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