Bessere Politik dank Deregulierung des politischen Prozesses

Analyse & Kritik 23 (1):43-60 (2001)
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Abstract

Today political competition and thus the politicians’ incentives to cater for the citizens’ preferences are weakened by protectionist regulations aiming at the politicians’ origin, their incomes and the ‘production process of politics’. This paper suggests abolishing these regulations and institutionalizing an open, international market for politics. Foreign as well as profit-seeking ‘policy producers’ should be allowed to run directly for office without nominating specific individuals. This enables a policy supplier to become active in several countries and jurisdictions and thus to build up an international reputation for being credible, i.e. of sticking to his promises and not exploiting the voters after election. The deregulation programme strengthens the influence of the weakly organized social groups and the governments' incentives to pursue what is of general interest.

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