Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):36-55 (2019)
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Abstract

In ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual...

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Daniel Kalpokas
National University of Córdoba

Citations of this work

Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge.Daniel Kalpokas - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1):49-70.
Intuitional Content or Avoiding the Myth of the Given – A Dilemma for McDowell.Israel Beer-Sheva - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (3):272-293.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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