Do we have a moral responsibility to compensate for vulnerable groups? A discussion on the right to health for LGBT people

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 20 (3):335-341 (2017)
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Abstract

Vulnerability is a broad concept widely addressed in recent scholarly literature. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people are among the vulnerable populations with significant disadvantages related to health and the social determinants of health. Medical ethics discourse tackles vulnerability from philosophical and political perspectives. LGBT people experience several disadvantages from both perspectives. This article aims to justify the right to health for LGBT people and their particular claims regarding healthcare because they belong to a vulnerable group. Rawls’ theory of justice and Norman Daniels’ normal functioning approach will be discussed in this context. Despite the fact that the right to health can be justified by Daniels’ normal functioning approach, there is still a theoretical gap in justifying the right to health for particular vulnerable populations such as LGBT peopleand discussing society’s duty to compensate for these disadvantages. In search of solid theoretical grounds for the justification of the right to health for LGBT people, the present author takes the opportunity to utilize Daniels’ flexible definition of normal functioning to show that normal functioning not only varies by age but also by different states of human existence, including sexual orientation and gender identity, and to propose replacing the life span approach with normal states of human existence.

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