Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383 (2013)
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Abstract

In recent papers and a book, Heather Douglas has expanded on the well-known argument from inductive risk, thereby launching an influential contemporary critique of the value-free ideal for science. This paper distills Douglas’s critique into four major claims. The first three claims provide a significant challenge to the value-free ideal for science. However, the fourth claim, which delineates her positive proposal to regulate values in science by distinguishing direct and indirect roles for values, is ambiguous between two interpretations, and both have weaknesses. Fortunately, two elements of Douglas’s work that have previously received much less emphasis provide resources for developing a more promising approach for regulating values in science

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Citations of this work

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The new demarcation problem.Bennett Holman & Torsten Wilholt - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91 (C):211-220.
Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
The diverse aims of science.Angela Potochnik - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:71-80.

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References found in this work

Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
Three Kinds of Idealization.Michael Weisberg - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (12):639-659.
In defence of the value free ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.

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