Abstract

This thesis is about moods in works of art, and how moods expressed in art can change how we view the world. Among those who speak of the value of discussing moods in philosophical aesthetics, it is normally assumed that the value of moods is in the way they are induced in the viewer of the work. In this thesis, I will argue that such an argument is not the best. Those who think moods are not relevant to aesthetics have only to argue either that being induced with emotions is not an ideal way of approaching art, or that such reactions as being induced with mood belong to the more rare cases of approaching art. Therefore, focusing on how moods are induced hinders the potential of discussing moods in art. Instead I argue that the value of moods is in the way they are expressed. I argue that moods can be understood as a form of symbolic schemas. They affect how the world appears, and how one sorts and organizes things in the world. One can therefore use moods as resources for getting knowledge about the world. Because some works of art express moods, where expression is understood as metaphorical exemplification, they make the viewer epistemically aware of the mood. Thus one can imagine being in the mood expressed. Thereby moods can lead to knowledge, also in cases where they are not literally induced. When one succesfully imagines being in an expressed mood, parts of the world are sorted and organized differently as in accordance with the mood.