The necessity of Self-Evident Perceptions in Islamic Philosophy and their Criterion

Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 3 (210):27-46 (2009)
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Abstract

The question of self-evident perceptions is among the important and effective subjects in Islamic philosophy that nowadays can be put forward as "epistemology". This question, in spite of its great importance and unique role in Islamic philosophers' epistemology, has not been discussed in detail by them. And as a result of ambiguities lied behind the criterion by which the self- evident perceptions can be distinguished from theoretical ones, once in a while the former may be misplaced by the latter and questioned, or the latter misplaced by the former and taken as axiomatic. The present paper, on the one hand, tries to explain the significance of self-evident perceptions in Islamic philosophy, and to present and assess the differentiae between them and theoretical ones, on the other. The task is undertaken by the author as follow. Firstly, he seeks to show that the self-evident data are the essence of all apodictic knowledge, so that no certain and indubitable cognition can be acquired without them. Secondly, the most principal criterion by which self- evident data can be distinguished from the other ones, among the many criteria cited in the works by Islamic thinkers, is the simplicity as to concepts and the necessary, immediate rational affirmability with no need to any other judgment or reasoning as to judgments.

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