Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue that contrary to much of the recent philosophical literature, integrity and impartiality are not hopelessly at odds. When we refine our accounts of integrity and impartiality, will see that they are much more compatible than has been suggested. I begin by giving an account of the person of integrity that articulates several conditions that agents must meet in order to demonstrate integrated agency and an integrated character. These conditions include reflective endorsements, strong evaluations, and an integrated motivational and character structure. ;In Chapter Two, I show that the dominant views of impartiality include not just the ideals of unbiased consideration or the fair application of moral norms, but substantive strategies for how to achieve these aims. I suggest that there are alternative strategies that enable us to reach the goals of impartiality without demanding that we take an impersonal point of view or regard all agents as interchangeable. At the end of this chapter, I argue that attempts to bifurcate the moral universe into spheres where impartiality is appropriate and those where it is not are misguided because the ideals of unbiased and consistent deliberation are just as necessary in intimate relationships as in more impersonal ones. ;In Chapter Three, I argue that integrity requires agents to have a consistent set of identity conferring commitments. I consider and reject Railton's attempt to show that an agent could have both identity conferring commitments to friendship and to consequentialism. Similarly, I reject Calhoun and Lugones' view that under certain circumstances, integrity might require an agent to resist making her commitments consistent. In each case, I argue that the motivational structures that are proposed do not meet the conditions for integrated agency or integrated characters. ;In the final chapter, I argue that oppression damages our ability to have integrity because it forces a schism between our desires and our judgments or our judgments and our actions. Agents are compelled to act in ways which are contrary to their own judgments in order to survive within oppressive systems. And to the extent that it results in internalized oppression, agents lack the motivational structure characteristic of persons of integrity