Abstract

Politics seem most alien to the demand for truth, for they engage the future which is, on principle, undeterminable, whereas truth conversely requires that the object be determined according to strict rules. Yet, political philosophy has never renounced the quest for a true understanding of human living_together, an understanding that makes becoming predictable, thus denying its contingency. However lofty, the ambition nonetheless elicited the most devastating political experience in history: totalitarianism. Such a disaster would seem to call for cautious relativism, but letting oneself be ruled by the arbitrariness of opinions is just as irresponsible as obeying the necessity of a postulated "destiny."Such is the quandary whose challenge was taken up by Hannah Arendt. In so doing, Arendt does not dismiss the true from the sphere of action. She seeks to comprehend which uses of truth cancel political lucidity and which uses of truth conversely warrant political lucidity. What shapes Arendt's position is a battle waged on several fronts, pointing to three distinct goals which this article proposes to address successively: first, the ambition to rescue politics from any "true law of history" which would aim at governing them; secondly, the ambition to rescue politics from the political lies in charge of their rewriting; thirdly, the ambition to rescue politics from a value relativism which would be irresponsible or cynical. Rational truth, factual truth, and opinion are all successively implicated, even though one cannot simply dissociate them from one another.