False Consciousness and the Socially Extended Mind

Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):24-35 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper I present a problem for the Marxist idea of false consciousness, namely how it is vulnerable to accusations of dogmatism. I will argue that the concept must be further developed if it is to provide a plausible tool for systematic social analysis. In the second half of the paper I will show how this could be done if the account of false consciousness incorporates Shaun Gallagher’s theory of the socially extended mind. This is a theory that explores how the mind expands towards external objects and systems. I will conclude that it helps to reinstate false consciousness as a reliable tool for the analysis of cognitive dynamics within power structures.

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Ane Engelstad
University of Bergen

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References found in this work

Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
Ideology: An Introduction.Terry Eagleton - 1991 - Studies in East European Thought 45 (3):229-230.

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