La rationalité est-elle incodifiable?

Philosophia Scientiae 6 (2):91-107 (2002)
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Abstract

This papere discusses a thesis which underlies Davidson's philosophy of interpretation: the incodifiability of rationality. It is shown that the thesis is involved in Davidson's use of the principle of charity. The thesis is criticized: the principles of rationality do not come from nowhere. At least a strong nucleus of psychological rationality must be codifiable.

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Pascal Engel
École des hautes études en sciences sociale

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On Knowing One's Own Language.Barry C. Smith - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 391--428.

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