Peut-on parler de croyances délirantes?

Abstract

This paper examines the status of delusive beliefs as beliefs. I argue that there is no reason not to call them beliefs, and suggest some strategies to cope with them.

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Pascal Engel
École des hautes études en sciences sociale

Citations of this work

A Logical Defence of Maher’s Model of Polythematic Delusions.Paul Franceschi - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35 (2):451-475.

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