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Self ascriptions of Beliefs
Abstract
An analysis of the first/third person asymmetry and in the light of Moore's paradox and Shoemaker's views on first person perspective.Author's Profile
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PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
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