Abstract

This critical work proceeds in a scholarly manner to show that Hume's Treatise, which has been ignored as a source for his moral theory, is of definite value for a correct and complete interpretation of his ethics. It is the author's contention that Hume's moral theory is closely connected to his psychology, which is set out in the Treatise. The author presents various interpretations he considers incorrect, exposing their faults and then suggesting an alternative view. Árdal is not attempting a reconstruction of Hume's ethics nor a complete explanation of the theory of passions. Rather it is his aim to show that the value expressions of approval-disapproval are passions, and a knowledge of the origins and causes of the indirect passions provides the key to their understanding. Also included in this discussion are accounts of the natural and artificial virtues and the role of evaluative language in Hume's philosophy.—E. C.