Abstract

_p_-Hacking, the use of analytic techniques that may lead to distorted research results, is widely condemned on epistemic and practical grounds. The prevalent position on this questionable research practice is that _p-_hacking should be avoided because it raises the probability of obtaining false-positive results, which can have harmful practical consequences. I have three aims in this paper. First, I offer a precise definition of _p-_hacking, something sorely needed in discussions of the practice. Second, I use philosophical tools from decision theory to articulate the prevalent position on _p-_hacking and demonstrate its flaws. While _p-_hacking can have epistemic and practical costs, a more nuanced approach to its consequences is necessary. Third, I argue that there are scenarios in which _p-_hacking can be warranted. The prevalent position neglects key factors in its overall evaluation of the consequences of _p-_hacking. Moreover, it disregards considerations that can lend support to decisions about analytic choices that amount to _p-_hacking. One important, but often neglected consideration is that, while _p-_hacking may lead to more false-positives, it also increases the chances of uncovering true-positives. I appeal to non-epistemic judgments to defend the view that there are situations in which _p-_hacking may be warranted.