Hume’s Philosophical Schizophrenia

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1): 14-22 (1990)
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Abstract

The author argues that there is no problematic conflict in Hume between philosophical reflection and ordinary life but among "conflicting intuitions at the philosophical level." The return to ordinary belief is not a satisfactory outcome for Hume because Hume thinks that the sceptical stance should be adopted in ordinary life. His realization that he holds unjustifiable beliefs is a philosophical issue that throws light on the nature of belief.

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Imagination and Experimentalism in Hume’s Philosophy.Andrew Ward - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):165-175.

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