The problem of noncounterfactual conditionals

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):676-688 (2009)
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Abstract

I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 Leuven, Belgium; e‐mail: [email protected].

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References found in this work

Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.
Indicative conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
The problem of counterfactual conditionals.Nelson Goodman - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (5):113-128.

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