Abstract

This article explores the implications of what it means to moralize about future technological innovations. Specifically, I comment on three papers that explore what seems to be an impending social reality: the availability of life-like sex robots. In response, I critically assess what it means to moralize about future technological innovations from a fully secular perspective; i.e., a perspective grounded in an immanent, socio-historically contingent view. I review the arguments of Nancy Jecker Sex robots: Their social impact and the future of human relations. Springer, Lisse, 2022), Mark Howard and Robert Sparrow Sex robots: Their social impact and the future of human relations. Springer, Lisse, 2022), and Wang Jue Sex robots: Their social impact and the future of human relations. Springer, Lisse, 2022) concerning the permissible limits of human-robot sexual interaction. I argue that we are in a poor epistemic position regarding what the actual future human response will be towards sex robots and how such developments will affect society. Given such a poor epistemic position, I argue that moralizing about future trends, like human-robot sex, is difficult because we do not have the relevant facts with which to work. Furthermore, I remain sceptical as to policy recommendations based on socio-historically contingent moral viewpoints because they do not carry any in principle moral authority to direct what future others may or may not do with their own private property. Moreover, such recommendations may not even possess moral appeal to future persons or societies as secular morality is plural and consistently develops anew.