Abstract

Two traditional opinions about the relations between logic and thought are presented: first, that logic and thought have nothing to do with each other; second, that logic is the empirical science of thought. This second view is known as psychologism. I characterize a third view, which I call psycho--logicism, according to which logic is not dependent on thought, as in psychologism, but in which thought is dependent on logic-contrary to the first picture described. The argument for psycho-logicism is that logic has a normative relation to thought and that thought cannot exist except in rough conformity with its norms. ;To make good on part of this, I defend the claim that logic has a normative relation to thought. I argue that logic provides permissive, or justificatory, norms for thought; negative obligations but not positive obligations; and what I call presumptive norms, that recommend certain beliefs on the basis of other beliefs, and also function as norms for the attribution of beliefs to others. What grounds these norms is that they derive from certain parts of logic that have a special status: any rational creature must grasp them. In particular, I argue that any rational creature must both have the concepts of negation, conjunction, disjunction and conditionality, and the ability to perform certain inferences with those concepts. ;Finally, I discuss the use of reflective equilibrium in the epistemology of logic. Although this is often presented as obvious and benign, it turns out to have controversial consequences. It may entail psychologism, and it suggests the logic may either be empirical, or that its normative force is limited