Die Person als kommunikationsfähiges Wesen zwischen Natur und Konsens

Phainomena 59 (2006)
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Abstract

In the history of philosophy and in contemporary debate too, the notion of person is interpreted as a true characteristic of human being: as his specific nature. In this paper, against this interpretation, the concept of person is discussed form another viewpoint: the “consent theory” developed by Karl-Otto Apel’s Kommunikationsethik and Jürgen Habermas’ Diskursethik. Starting from Boethius’s theory of person and criticizing it, the author will found another idea of person, based on the perspective of an ethics of human communication

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Adriano Fabris
University of Pisa

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