Abstract

Coercion is still highly prevalent in contemporary psychiatry. Qualitative research indicates, however, that patients and psychiatric staff have different understandings of what they mean by ‘coercion’. Psychiatric staff primarily employ the concept as referring to instances of formal coercion regulated by law, such as involuntary hospital admission or treatment. Patients, on the other hand, use a broader concept, which also understands many instances of informal psychological pressure as coercive. We point out that the predominance of a narrow concept of coercion in psychiatry can have negative consequences for patients, and argue that this difference in how the concept ‘coercion’ is used is both grounded in epistemic oppression and reinforces such oppression. Epistemic oppression, as defined by Dotson, refers to the persistent epistemic exclusion of members of marginalized groups from participation in practices of knowledge production. We first demonstrate how patients may experience inferential inertia when communicating their experiences of coercion. We then show that the resulting predominance of a narrow concept of coercion in psychiatry can be described as a case of hermeneutical injustice in a context shaped by institutional hermeneutical ignorance. We argue for a change in institutional practices in psychiatry that allows for the adequate consideration of patients’ perspectives on coercion.