Abstract

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the intersection of feminism and logic, posing questions such as: Can any or all logics be feminist? If feminist logic exists, then how might it be identified? How one answers these questions will be determined by one’s understanding of logic and of feminism. Given how many controversial questions there are regarding logic, this is not a trivial remark: some disagreements about feminist logic may turn out to be mere misunderstandings. In order to address the issue properly, we need to attend to fundamental concepts. In this paper, I argue that the best way of understanding feminist logic is by focusing, first, on feminist philosophy of logic. In Section 1, I introduce the Feminist Critique of Reason, from the 1980s–90s. In Section 2, I discuss contemporary work on feminist logic and show that it is in some ways a continuation of, and in other ways a departure from, this history. In Section 3, I emphasize what is common to all work in feminist logic: a higher-order commitment to feminist methodology while studying logic. I consequently define feminist philosophy of logic as philosophy of logic that answers and is answerable to feminist philosophy. Feminist logic is a theory of logical consequence that is grounded in feminist philosophy of logic. I show that this definition correctly captures the scope of feminist logic. In Section 4, I argue that, despite recent objections, exceptionalism—understood as commitment to traditional conceptions of logical consequence—is compatible with feminist logic.