Civic Liberalism and the “Dialogical Model” of Judicial Review

Law and Philosophy 25 (5):489-531 (2006)
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Abstract

In a world that is inherently indeterminate, a suitable theory of distributive justice must perhaps itself be indeterminate, and its indeterminacies must accommodate those of the world where relevant.Russell Hardin, Indeterminacy and Society.

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