Not every feeling is intentional

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):39 - 52 (2009)
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Katalin Farkas
Central European University

References found in this work

The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.

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