Abstract

The chapter argues that the natural law tradition’s conception of public reason is more consistent than that of political liberalism, especially when it comes to bioethical legislation. After offering a précis of Thomist natural law theory, the chapter examines Alasdair MacIntyre’s treatment of the rational resolution of moral disagreements and argues that, in line with the natural law tradition, public reason should be construed as a shared political deliberation that is rooted in truth-directed inquiry. Furthermore, MacIntyre points to how such a truth-directed inquiry requires a set of commitments which correspond to the primary precepts of natural law. A just political order should pursue and promote this sort of public reasoning, even amid the systematic and apparently intractable moral disagreement of a pluralistic society. However, whereas MacIntyre believes that such shared deliberation is no longer possible outside local communities, we shall reflect, with the aid of the natural law tradition’s conception of legislation, on how his proposals might carry over to the full-fledged public reasoning of political decision-making. We conclude that the natural law tradition’s conception of public reason is more consistent than that of political liberalism when it comes to legislation on bioethical issues, such as abortion and medically assisted suicide. By requiring that laws be morally justified through truth-directed inquiry into the relevant second-order issues, it has more rigorous standards against arbitrariness.