Das archaische Selbst und seine Stiftungen

Phänomenologische Forschungen 2021 (1):48-70 (2021)
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Abstract

The present paper aims to shed light on the contribution of Richirian phenomenology to the problem of ipseity. To do so, I show how Marc Richir’s perspective can be situated in relation to the Husserlian issue of the transcendental genesis of the I, contrasting it with other positions elaborated in contemporary French philosophy (Henry and Levinas). I show that ipseity must be thought within the framework of a genetic phenomenology of the self in its facticity related to an archaic, unprethinkable dimension of affectivity. However, the archaic self can never be conceived of independently of its institutions. I argue that in the framework of the Richirian architectonics one can distinguish three institutions of the self: the institution of the self-positing ego, the symbolic ins itution of narrative identity, and the imaginary institution of the imagery of the self. This coalescence of the archaic dimension and the institutions of the self alsomakes it possible to envisage a phenomenology of the ages of the self.

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