Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (I, iv, 6): Personal Identity

Abstract

We are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; we feel its existence and its continuing to exist, and are certain - more even than any demonstration could make us - both of its perfect identity and of its simplicity. The strongest sensations and most violent emotions, instead of distracting us from this view ·of our self·, only focus it all the more intensely, making us think about how these sensations and emotions affect our self by bringing it pain or pleasure. To offer further evidence of the existence of one’s self would make it less evident, not more, because no fact we could use as evidence is as intimately present to our consciousness as is the existence of our self. If we doubt the latter, we can’t be certain of anything

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,518

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Perception of the Self.George S. Pappas - 1992 - Hume Studies 18 (2):275-280.
The Emotion of Self-Reflexive Anxiety.Ruth Rebecca Tietjen - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (3):297-315.
Hume on Finding an Impression of the Self.Saul Traiger - 1985 - Hume Studies 11 (1):47-68.
Why Are We Certain that We Exist?Alexandre Billon - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
Alienated Emotions and Self-Knowledge.Krista Thomason - 2023 - In Alba Montes Sánchez & Alessandro Salice (eds.), Emotional Self-Knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 39-55.
Self-Awareness and The Elusive Subject.Robert J. Howell - 2023 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-10-21

Downloads
67 (#317,789)

6 months
67 (#87,361)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references