Reliability and Justification

The Monist 68 (2):159-174 (1985)
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Abstract

According to a simple version of the reliability theory of epistemic justification, a belief is justified if and only if the process leading to that belief is reliable. The idea behind this theory is simple and attractive. There are a variety of mental or cognitive processes that result in beliefs. Some of these processes are reliable—they generally yield true beliefs—and the beliefs they produce are justified. Other processes are unreliable and the beliefs they produce are unjustified. So, for example, reliable processes such as perception and memory yield justified beliefs while an unreliable process such as wishful thinking—believing something as a result of wishing that it is true—yields unjustified beliefs.

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Richard Feldman
University of Rochester

Citations of this work

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.
A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem.Juan Comesaña - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27-47.

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