Review of paradoxes afflicting various voting procedures where one out of m candidates (m ≥ 2) must be elected [Book Review]

Abstract

The paper surveys 17 deterministic electoral procedures for selecting one out of two or more candidates, as well as the susceptibility of each of these procedures to various paradoxes. A detailed appendix exemplifies the paradoxes to which each electoral procedure is susceptible. It is concluded that from the perspective of vulnerability to serious paradoxes, as well as in light of additional technical criteria, Copeland’s or Kemeny’s proposed procedures are the most desirable.

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References found in this work

The Theory of Committees and Elections.Duncan Black - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):248-249.
Condorcet's paradox.William V. Gehrlein - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (2):161-197.
.Iain McLean - unknown
[Omnibus Review].John G. Kemeny - 1954 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (2):134-134.

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